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Abstract
The fact that education plays a major part for wealth of nations has been known for quite some
time, but the debate over the true relationship between school funding and student performance
is ongoing in both academia and among policymakers. They all want to answer the same question
- how can the returns of education be maximized?
We use a centralization reform in Stockholm from 2007 to estimate the causal effect of increased
school funding on student performance. We study three measurements: Grade point average, the
amount of students that at least got a pass in every class and the amount of students that got the
grades required to graduate. The studied schools are public primary schools in Stockholm.
The study was done by using a difference-in-difference approach with GPA, Pass and Grad as
our outcome variables. Our findings show that the reform created clear winners and losers in terms
of school funding and that the majority of school budgets were unchanged. Our results however
show no statistically significant short term effects on student performance whether a school was a
winner or not.
Keywords School funding, Student performance, School centralization reform
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1 Introduction
In 2007 the newly elected center-right coalition in Stockholm decided to centralize the responsibility
for public primary schools from 18 districts to one central School and Education Division. This
reform affected the schools in two ways: 1) A new management system and 2) a new resource
allocation model. The new organization had all principals answering directly to a central education
division in contrast to the system before in which all the districts1 had their own school division.
The change in school funding was a consequence of the new organization. The districts could no
longer influence how much money a school would recieve. The new model treated every school
equal and it made some schools winners and some losers in terms of funding.
Even though this restructure created both winners and losers we will not study the effect of
decreased school funding; this is partly because almost no schools were losers in absolute terms
since the policymakers increased the total funding during the years after the reform in order to
make the implementation more accepted. We also wanted to limit our research question to that
of increased funding instead of studying change in resource funding, this due to studies claiming
that the effect is different for an increase and a decrease in funding (Heller Sahlgren 2014).
There are two things that we are able to say with this quasi-experimental study. The first
is that there were clear winners and losers after the reform. The winners were mainly schools
with a student body with lower socioeconomic status, the opposite being true for losers. The
second conclusion that can be drawn is that our results indicate, but do not prove that there is a
positive effect on student performance of increasing school funding. We cannot show a statistically
significant relationship between resources and our student performance variables. This could either
be because the data and methods available for this thesis are not sufficient. It could also be because
there is no causal effect.
This thesis consists of nine sections. Section 1-5 describes the centralization reform in detail
and how we define winners and losers. Section 6-7 examine if the winners in terms of money
also became winners when it comes to student performance. In section 8-9 we discuss the results
and present the conclusions. There are three appendices that cover the school organization in
Stockholm, data and results.
2 Literature review
The literature on resources effect on students’ performance is vast to say the least. But even
though the number of studies is impressive the literature lacks an overarching consensus. One of
the most cited papers is Hanusheks meta-analysis of 377 studies, which concludes that there is
1See appendix A for more description on the school organization in Stockholm before the reform
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no discernible effect on student performance caused by an increase in spending (Hanushek 1997).
Other quantitative reviews on the contrary argue that resources have a positive effect (Hedges et al.
1994). One of the most well-known studies that shows a positive effect is the STAR-project which
also serves as a baseline for many studies when comparing effect size. We also want to mentioned
that there are studies showing that students and teachers react differently to an increase compared
to a decrease in resources (Heller Sahlgren 2014). This, and also delimitation, servers as reasons
for why this thesis only will study an increase in school funding.
Hanusheks review is arguably the most cited work in this field of research but it has more
recently been exposed to critique. Lindahl and Kreuger show that the conclusions drawn from
Hanusheks meta-analysis is highly dependent on how the reports are weighted in the meta-analysis
(Krueger and Lindahl 2002). Most of the reports Hanushek bases his analysis on were also made
before the 90’s and since then new methods and data has become available. A few less cited but
more recent studies have strengthened the evidence for a positive relation between resources and
student performance. They also emphasize that experimental or quasi-experimental studies are
superior to studies relying on observational data. One recent working paper uses a research design
that includes court rulings in USA as a quasi-experimental identification strategy Jackson et al.
2014. They find that resources do matter for students from poor families, while they do not find
any significant effect on students from non-poor families. They also stress the importance of using
exogenous changes to estimate the effect of changes in school funding.
”The stark contrast between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates underscores the impor-
tance of relying on exogenous variation in school spending. Importantly, the contrast
between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates in our data provides an explanation for why
these estimates might differ from other influential studies in the literature (e.g., Cole-
man et al., 1966, Betts, 1995, Hanushek, 1996, and Grogger, 1996). We suspect some
prior studies that lacked a compelling research design to isolate causal effects of spend-
ing may have produced modest estimated effects of school spending due to unresolved
endogeneity biases.” (Jackson et al. 2014)
This is also commented on by Fredriksson and O¨ckert 2007 who made the same observation.
In their study they use the decentralization policy from the early 90’s in Sweden as a natural
experiment. They get significant results with roughly the same effect size as the STAR-project.
An even more recent study use the fact that Sweden earlier had a cap on class sizes to analyze the
long term effect of class size (Fredriksson, O¨ckert, and Oosterbeek 2012). They further strengthen
the notion that there are interesting results to be found within the field of quasi-experimental
studies on school funding. Fredriksson and O¨ckert also claim that there are very few studies done
on European data with a credible identification strategy.
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Even though there are some tendencies in the current research that could change the old
consensus, most researchers seem to agree that increasing school spending alone is not an efficient
way to increase student performance (Hanushek 1997). One of the problems is that even if we know
that a school got more resources, we might not necessarily know that they used it efficiently and
how or on what they spent it on (Hanushek 2003). This makes it hard to make any inference and
the better studies usually have richer data sets that make it possible to control for these factors.
These kinds of data sets are not all too common, since they require a lot of time and resources to
construct.
One final topic that we feel the need to mention is the theory that of schools and their func-
tional form. We will not go into this in any great detail for delimitation reasons, though we felt
that this was too important to leave out since it is could be one of the reasons that we do not
find any significant effect in this study. Figlo (1999) argues in his article Functional form and the
estimated effects of school resources that one of the reasons to why studies have failed to show a
strong correlation between resources and student performance is due to making the wrong assump-
tions about schools and their functional form. Figlo argues that one cannot simply compare an
impoverished school with a rich school, since they most likely does not share the same functional
form (Figlo 1999). This will be covered in more detail in the discussion.
3 Institutional background
3.1 Background to the reform
The reform was a major change to the school organization in Stockholm. Since early 1990’s the
public primary schools had been governed by 18 separate district boards within the city. Even
though taxes were collected at the municipality level and then distributed to the district, every
district could up to a point make their own decisions about their schools’ budgets. The degree of
autonomy for the districts had been a highly debated political issue around which the opposing
political alternatives were fighting. Between 1998-2002 when a center-right coalition governed the
city and the Liberal Party was in charge of school policy they earmarked some of the district funding
for education. After this at least 70 percent of the funding that was intended for education had to
be allocated directly to the schools. When a left wing majority regained power in 2002 they left
the base funding largely unchanged but added a second school grant. This grant was substantially
smaller but based on a socioeconomic index in order to create a more equitable school funding. It
was also a way to produce more transparency and predictability since it replaced a more complex
system of compensating schools for various cost driving students. The money however was not
allocated directly to schools but rather to the districts and could thus be distributed in any way
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they found fit, they did not even have to use them for school purposes.
3.2 A centralized school organization
When the center-right majority reemerged as winners in the election of 2006 they decided to
centralize the whole school organization. The reform was implemented over the summer of 2007
and after that every school faced the same resource model that was decided by the city council,
not the districts. The new model had roughly the same parameters as the old model the city had
used to allocate money to the districts. The biggest difference was that the schools, and not the
districts, now got full authority to spend the money. The parameters in the model included the
number of students in different ages and the socioeconomic composition of the schools. This is the
reform that we are studying in this thesis.
The reform can be characterized as an exogenous shock for the schools. The official rational
behind the reform was to create a transparent, fair and equal system where every school faced the
same resource allocation model without loopholes. Here is a quote from Lotta Edholm, deputy
major and responsible for the restructure taken from a newspaper at the time of the implementa-
tion:
”- Ett enkelt, genomskinligt och mer ra¨ttvist system. Tidigare hade vi arton olika sa¨tt
att sko¨ta v˚ara skolor, nu har vi ett. Och jag kan garantera att rektorerna kommer att
bli no¨jda, sa¨ger hon.”2 (By 2007)
Centralization was also a part of the political agenda that the Liberal Party was promoting.
They wanted to centralize the school organization in Sweden as much as possible. This would
indicate that the reform was motivated by political reasons and was a consequence of the new
political majority. The interviews we have conducted with Lotta Edholm, representing the political
majority at the time and Johanna Engman; a public official with responsibility for implementing
the reform, tell two different stories about the immediate rational for the reform. Mrs Edholm
emphasized the alleged mismanagement of some districts and that money intended for education
was used elsewhere. Mrs Engman said on the contrary that almost all money the districts got for
education was used for that purpose. There are two sides to this story but there were undoubtedly
multiple reasons for the reform. We can however be confident that there was no direct correlation
between student performance and the change in resources imposed by the reform. Since the school
themselves were unable to affect the outcome this is another indication that this was an exogenous
shock. This does not however allow us to assume that there are no endogeneity bias what so ever
when analyzing the data. For that we would need an actual experimental setting.
2”- A simple, transparent and more equitable system. Previously we had eighteen different ways of running our
schools, now we have one. And I can guarantee that the principals will be satisfied, she says.”
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Figure i: Timeline of school reforms
2002
2011
New left wing majority in Stockholm
Absence no longer reported in grades in
Stockholm2003
Documentation of individual development
plans compulsory
Compensatory resource allocation introduced
in Stockholm
The School Inspection becomes a separate
agency
2006
New center-right majority in Stockholm (and
in national government)
Absence once again reported in grades in
Stockholm2007
The centralization reform in Stockholm
National tests in third grade
2008
Teacher education reform
National test in science2010
New school law
New curriculum
New law on funding for independent school
Teacher certificate
This is not an exhausting list of all reforms during this period but rather a selection of the most relevant for this
thesis.
3.3 Other school reforms around this time
This was the major education reform in Stockholm around this time and the resource model had not
been subject to any larger changes since the last reform in 2003. Around 2011-2012 the model was
changed again (Burestam 2010) along with the national legislation for independent schools that
changed the resource allocation from municipalities (prop 2009/10:157). Even though no other
major changes to the resource allocation were made during the 2-3 years around the centralization
reform there were a few other school reforms going on within this general time frame. Figure i
outlines some of the bigger events from 2002 to 2011.
The policy changes that happened around the same time as the centralization reform could
cause a problem when analyzing the causal effect of the reform. Fortunately none of these other
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reforms seem to have a clear effect on student performance.
Reporting absenteeism in the students’ grades was reintroduced around the same time as the
centralization but there is not much evidence to support that it had any effect on student perfor-
mance. Absenteeism was of course reported even before 2007, the difference being only whether
they were written in the grades or not. In addition to that the absenteeism was never reported in
the final grade that students use to apply for high school or to get a job.
The introduction of national tests in third grade was a big reform which demanded that all
students should take the same tests in Swedish, Mathematics and English. However it did not
impact the students we observe in this paper. The same thing goes for the teacher education
reform.
In 2010 all ninth graders had to take a mandatory test in science (Lundqvist and Lidar 2013),
this would directly impact the students we are studying. It is likely that their grades in science
dropped as a consequence of this. We base this assumption on the fact that national tests impact
how teachers grade their students (Skolverket 2009).
The earlier reform to the resource allocation model in 2003 will most probably impact the
schools and we want to make sure that our observed results are not intertwined with the effect of
that reform. That is why our preferred time window to study this reform is 2006-2009. Both the
national test in science and of the huge amount of reforms that was implemented in 2011 will be
our reasons for not including 2010.
4 Data
The sample includes all public primary schools in Stockholm with graduating students two years
before and after the reform.3 That include 59 schools and 5 of those were excluded from our
data-set for reasons mentioned below.
There are four kinds of data in our thesis; 1) data on school funding, 2) data on student
performance, 3) data on student background and 4) data on school size. The student performance,
background and school size data comes from the two national databases SALSA (Skolverkets
Arbetsverktyg fo¨r Lokala SambandsAnalyser) and SIRIS (Skolverkets Internetbaserade Resultat-
och kvalitetsInformationsSystem) and the data on school funding was collected from the School
and Education Division and the District Councils in the City of Stockholm (Stockholm stad).
It is important to note that the years in our data and in this study in general refer to the
academic years and not calendar years. When an arbitrary year is referred to in this study, for
instance 20074, it means the academic year 2006/07. In these terms the centralization reform took
3See table B1 in appendix B for a list of all schools.
4When referring to half years/semesters the notation 2005:1 or 2005:2 is used to indicate if it is the first or second
half year.
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place between 2007 and 2008 but in terms of actual dates the reform was implemented on the first
of July 2007.
4.1 Measuring school funding
We are studying a reform of the resource allocation model i.e. budgets, but budgets do not always
reflect how much money a school actually spent. So we decided to look at the accounting from
every school and from that derive the total cost per year. Schools manage their economy by the
calendar year and not by the academic year, so in order to match a schools cost for a full academic
year we collected cost data by half years. For the post-reform period that data are readily available
but the pre-reform data is not perfect in this respect. In 13 of the 54 schools we had to take the
full year cost and divide by two in order to get an approximate half year cost. This is not ideal,
especially because the spring semester is a few days longer than the fall semester. But this should
not be a major problem since the undoubtedly largest cost for all schools are teacher salaries and
they are approximately the same for each semester.
The data is collected on individual school level and from 15 different data sources5. The pre-
reform data was gathered from the district council that was responsible for the schools at that time.
The data from the post-reform period was gathered from the School and Education Division. All
economic accounting in the City of Stockholm both before and after the reform had some common
routines, but not on every aspect. We do not know the details of these exemptions and which
districts had them, but the assumption is that the majority of the accounting followed the same
structure before and after the reform. But since we can not be sure we might get some measurement
error from this that will bias our results towards zero.
One thing we know is that there was a difference between different districts whether schools
paid for rent, electricity and the salary of the principal before the reform. After the reform this
was the same for all schools. In order to control for this variation, all rents are excluded from the
cost-data6. Electricity and principal wages are harder to control for and we cannot be sure that
they do not bias our treatment variable. The average wage for a principal at a public primary
school in Stockholm County in 2013 was approximately 850 000 SEK per year according to The
Swedish Association of School Principals and Directors of Education (Skolledarfo¨rbund 2014). The
total cost for a school during the period that we are studying ranges from 23 million SEK up to 95.5
million SEK with an average on 53 million SEK. This would imply that principal salaries would
adhere to on average 1.5% of the schools’ costs and as much as 3.6% for the smallest schools. The
5One is the School and Education Division and the 14 others are the districts, they are 14 and not 18 since 4
districts has been reorganized since the time of the reform
6In the code of accounts all rent costs have the code 510 both before and after the reform, thus allowing us to be
certain that the correct amount was excluded. For some district there were other code of account, but all divergence
from this general rule are displayed in table B2 in appendix B
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cost for electricity after the reform, when all schools paied for it, was on average lower than 1% of
the total cost. The conclusion we have drawn from this is that even if we do have some measurement
errors, these are likely to be small and will probably not bias our results in a significant way since
we are measuring the effect of increasing school funding by at least 20 percent.
With the cost data we constructed a cost per student variable. One threat to the validity of
this variable is that some schools have grade F-97 and some have only grade 7-9. This is a concern
since we know that the resource allocation was different for students in different grades8. Grade
composition does not however change a lot from year to year.
There are likely other factors that inflate our cost per student-variable. One is the costs for
students with intellectual disabilities and other special needs. The share of these students varies
quite a lot between schools and they demand a lot more resources then other students. The
schools are compensated for this but we cannot control for it when creating the cost per student
variable. Even though we cannot disentangle their cost, we have data on the number of students
with intellectual disabilities and we can see that their share of every school stays relative constant
during this period.
The implication of this is that a comparison in cost per student between schools is difficult
when we do not have individual data. There are reasons to believe that there are a number of
factors that inflate or deflate the value of some schools. When we look at our data see that these
factors seem to stay constant over time so it will not decrease the reliability just the validity of our
observed values. However if we compare relative changes in cost per student instead of absolute
changes we should not have the same problem.
Furthermore we had some schools showing up extreme values and they were removed from our
data set. This is not based on the assumption that outliers should be removed, but the fact that
they had reported their spending in a very different way than the other schools. In some cases
there are confirmed accounting errors that made us exclude schools. There is a detailed description
of the schools we removed and why in table B3 in appendix B.
4.2 Student data
All the data on student performance, background and school size have been collected at the school
level and not from individual data. The three standard measurements on student performance used
in the primary schools in Sweden are Grade point average (GPA), graduation rate (Grad) and the
percentage of students that get a passing grade in all subjects (Pass). The most conventional way
to measure student performance is however GPA and that will be our preferred measurement.
A students GPA was at this time calculated as the sum of 16 grades that can take one of the
7F stands for preschool class (fo¨rskoleklass) which is a voluntary education form for 6-year-olds
8More precise: there was one sum for students in grade 1-3, another for grade 4-6 and a third for grade 7-9
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following values: 0, 10, 15, 20 (a passing grade renders 10 points). The pass-measurement is rather
straight forward but it is worth noticing that a change only reflects changes between passing and
not passing grades. The graduation rate is also easy to interpret, in order to graduate from primary
school these years you had to get a passing grade in at least Mathematics, Swedish and English.
An increase in the graduation rate would imply that the worst performing students increased their
grades.
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Table 1: Variable list
Variable Discriptions
GPA Mean grade point average
Pass Percent of students who get a passing grade in all classes
Grad Percent of students who get a passing grade in Math, Swedish and En-
glish
Cost per student Total cost for a school divided by the number of students 1-9
Cost inf per stud Inflation adjusted cost per student
Cost inf res per
stud
Inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student
Log cost Log of the inflation adjusted cost per student
Born abroad Percent of students who are born abroad
Parent abroad Percent of students with one or both parent born abroad
Parent educ The average educational attainments of both biological parents where 1
indicate primary, 2 secondary and 3 tertiary education as their highest
level.
Proc boys Percent of student that are boys
Winners A dummy indicating if the school is a winner after the reform (Treatment
group)
Losers A dummy indicating if the school is a loser after the reform
Unchanged Unchanged after the reform
Non-winners Unchanged and losers of the reform (Control group)
Treatment Percent increase in inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student
after the reform
Post A dummy that is 1 if year = or > 2008
Year A vector of dummies indicating academic year
Time A time series that is 1 if year=2006, 2 if year=2007 . . .
Time2 The squared value of time
Winners x post Interaction between winners and post
Winners x 2008 Interaction between winners and year dummy for 2008
Winners x 2009 Interaction between winners and year dummy for 2009
District Indicated what district a school belonged to pre-reforma
School ID A unique identifier for each school
Alt-ID When School-ID has changed over time an alternative is presented
aIn appendix A all the districts and their corresponding dummy is presented
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GPA 216 219 28.6 144 276
Pass 215 74.2 16.1 28.3 98.4
Grad 216 88.4 12.0 41.3 100
Cost per stud 216 91328 27885 44616 184969
Cost inf per stud 216 87799 26286 44305 172878
Cost inf res per stud 216 80825 25915 41608 161254
Log cost 216 11.3 0.29 10.7 12.1
Parent edu 212 2.25 0.30 1.44 2.86
Proc boys 212 51.6 8.08 25.0 76.0
Parent abroad 212 17.6 16.4 0.00 77.0
Born abroad 212 14.0 14.5 0.00 71.0
Winners 216 0.15 0.36 0 1
Losers 216 0.13 0.34 0 1
Unchanged 216 .7 .4 0 1
Non-winners 216 .9 .4 0 1
Treatment 216 .7 17.1 -36.9 39.1
Post 216 0.50 0.50 0 1
Time 216 2.50 1.12 1 4
Time2 216 7.50 5.69 1 16
Winners x post 216 0.07 0.26 0 1
Winners x 2008 216 0 .2 0 1
Winners x 2009 216 0 .2 0 1
Note:There is missing values from one school on the socioeconomic composition
and there is one school without a value on Pass for 2009.
5 Defining winners and losers
The reform created winners and losers in terms of funding. But what is a credible way to categorize
the schools? How much more money must a school receive in order to be classified as a winner?
The creation of such categories is by default an arbitrary process, but there are some methods that
make more sense than others.
We start out by creating an inflation and time trend adjusted value for cost per student for
every school. The inflation rate comes from SCB 2015 and is presented in table 3. The inflation
adjusted costs are then used in the following regression:
Half year inflation adjusted cost per studentit = αi + β1τt + it (1)
Where τ is a time trend for each of the half years we have in our data (with τ = 1, 2, 3 . . . 11).
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From this regression we get that β̂1 = 774.8684 we use this value to time trend adjust the inflation
adjusted costs. This intermediary step is not absolut necessary but will make the process more
intuitive. The trend can be seen when comparing figure iii with figure iv, looking at the unadjusted
graph we can see that we have a clear upward trend, which is gone in the adjusted.
Table 3: Inflation
Year Index
2005 100.00
2006 101.40
2007 103.63
2008 107.15
2009 106.83
2010 108.22
We compare relative changes rather than absolute increases and
decreases in cost per student since the min- and max-values for cost per
student are quite far spread out. A 5 000 SEK per student increase for
one school might be seen as a substantial increase, while at the same
time being considered a small increase for another. So the winners
and losers will be defined by looking at their relative change pre- and
post-reform.
In order to cancel out noise we compare the average inflation and
time trend adjusted cost per student before and after the reform and
then use the percent change as our preferred variables on how much a school was affected by the
reform. For this we use the cost data from the calendar year 2005:1-2010:1. The reason for using
more years when defining winners and losers and not using those years for our regression is that
the resource trend is stable over the entire period with the reform year as an exception, which is
not the case for GPA, Grad and Pass for the reasons mentioned in section 3.
This process will give us a variable that we call treatment. Figure ii shows a histogram over
the distribution of the treatment. It varies from a decrease of 40 percent to roughly an increase in
40 percent.
Figure ii: Histogram on treatment
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From this variable we apply a symmetric
high and low cut-off point that decides if a
school is considered a winner or loser. In or-
der to come up with a reasonable cut-off value
we considered how much an ordinary school
usually deviate from its average value with-
out the reform year taken into account. Our
data shows that it deviates up to about 10%
and with an average deviation of 5%. We then
tried different cut-off points in order to see if
we received the same results for different cut-
off points and the results came out similar for
15%, 20% and 25% (see appendix B). The 20% cut-off point will however be the preferred since
the 15% cut-off came a bit too close to what could have been an ordinary fluctuation and the trade
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of just being that we got a 10% smaller winner group. The 25% cut-off would be better, since the
effect is greater, though choosing this would reduce the size of our winner group by an additional
25% and we decided that this trade-off were too big.
Now we have got a definition of winners and losers. Winners are the schools that have 20% or
more money after the reform and losers are the schools that got 20% less money. This is presented
graphically in figure iv and as the data in table 4. In table 5 the distribution of winners and losers
per district is shown. As we can see some districts had a lot of winners and some districts had
none.
Figure iii: Half year cost per student
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Figure iv: Inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student
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Table 4: Inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student
Winners Unchanged Losers Non-winners
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
schools 8 8 39 39 7 7 47 47
mean 38 530 49 730 40 806 40 786 36 857 26 704 40 205 38 643
st.dev of mean 347 1 942 458 1 209 1 466 1 160 506 1 109
n 40 48 200 240 35 42 235 282
Note:The table is based on inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student for total 54 schools. The
standard errors are calculated from the mean. All schools are observed 5 half years before the reform
and 6 half years after.
Table 5: Winners and losers by district
District Unchanged Winners Losers Total
Bromma 5 0 1 6
Enskeda-A˚rsta 3 0 0 3
Vanto¨r 2 1 0 3
Farsta 2 1 0 3
Ha¨gersten 2 0 0 2
Liljeholmen 2 0 0 2
Ha¨sselby-Va¨llingby 5 0 0 5
Rinkeby 2 0 0 2
Kungsholmen 1 1 0 2
Norrmalm 3 0 1 4
Kista 2 0 0 2
Skarpna¨ck 2 0 0 2
Ska¨rholmen 0 3 0 3
Sp˚anga-Tensta 2 0 2 4
Maria-Gamla stan 3 0 2 5
Katarina-Sofia 2 0 0 2
A¨lvsjo¨ 0 2 0 2
O¨stermalm 1 0 1 2
Total 39 8 7 54
Note:There is a map and a list in Appendix A that show where the districts are
situated in Stockholm
We argue that the reform was exogenous to the school but it does not appear to be truly random
which schools got more and which got less money. If it would have been, then the winners and non-
winners should display the roughly the same socioeconomic composition and student performance
as well as more even distribution between districts. Unfortunately this is not the case as can be
seen in tables 6 and 5. It is however not very surprising we would expect some districts to be fully
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treated. If also appears to be districts with lower socioeconomic status that are most treated, this
is explained by the fact that the socioeconomic compensatory resources allocation now became
mandatory. Far from all schools with low performing students was however treated. There are
some, but rather low correlation between GPA pre-reform and the size of the treatment as figure
v show. The random sampling is thus not perfect, but should not be a major threat to our project
as long as there are no significant group specific changes to the socioeconomic composition at the
winners and unchanged schools pre- to post-reform.
Figure v: Scatter plot with GPA pre-reform and treatment
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To test this assumption we look at table 6 which shows the socioeconomic variables we observe
reported as a mean before and after the reform. The plain difference imply that both foreign
background and born abroad change differently between the two groups. To test the significance
of these differences we run a Wilcoxon signed rank test (Cortinhas and Black 2012). The p-values
from the test are reported in the table 6. With the exemption of foreign background in the non-
winner group none of the changes in socioeconomic compositions are significant. From this we
can draw the conclusion that the changes in socioeconomic composition of schools does not drive
our treatment group classification, if that was the case we would have significant increases in the
winner group. The sections above will be covered in greater detail in section 8.
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Table 6: Socioeconomic composition pre- and post-reform
Winners
n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
born abroad pre 8 23 14.9 5.5 45
born abroad post 8 25 15.4 6 45.5
difference 8 2 4.8 -2.5 13
proc boys pre 8 54.3 5.6 45 62.5
proc boys post 8 52.1 5.6 44.5 62
difference 8 -2.2 4.9 -8 6
parent edu pre 8 2.1 0.2 1.9 2.4
parent edu post 8 2.1 0.2 1.9 2.4
difference 8 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
foreign backgr pre 8 44.2 22.0 10.5 74.5
foreign backgr post 8 48.3 26.3 9.5 80.5
difference 8 4.1 7.9 -5.5 20
Non-winners
n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
born abroad pre 45 12.6 14.6 0 66.5
born abroad post 45 11.8 12.4 .5 57.5
difference 45 -0.8 5.2 -23.5 9
proc boys pre 45 50.7 7.0 27.5 61.5
proc boys post 45 51.8 6.6 35 66.5
difference 45 1.1 7.4 -20 17.5
parent edu pre 45 2.3 .3 1.6 2.7
parent edu post 45 2.3 0.3 1.6 2.8
difference 45 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.2
foreign backgr pre 45 27.6 27.6 0 98.5
foreign backgr post 45 30.3 28.4 4 96.5
difference 45 2.8** 6.5 -6 23.5
Note: The differences are tested for statistical significance with a Wilcoxon
signed rank test where the significance level are reported like this: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Empirical strategy
The leading method for analyzing panel data is to run an OLS regression on the variable of
interest (Wooldridge 2013). That is also where we will start out. From the OLS estimation it is
accustomed to either try a fixed effects model, which in our case would be to use school fixed effects,
or a difference-in-difference approach. Wooldridge specifically points out that a DD-methodology
is very useful when dealing with a quasi-experiment and that is why we will turn directly to a
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DD-model after the OLS-estimation and not to a fixed effects model.
6.1 OLS
To estimate the effect of school funding on student performance we will start by making a simple
OLS with the cost data. It will however most likely not give any reasonable results. First of all
we know that our cost data are subject to some measurement error and it will most likely bias our
results, more on this in the discussion. Furthermore we do not fulfill all the assumptions required
to make an OLS BLUE, the first being random sampling. We can in hindsight see a clear pattern
of who got more and less resources, this is shown in tables 5 and 6.
We can also assume that the OLS is subject to omitted variable bias; the main reason for not
controlling for all known variables that could be correlated to our dependent variable is lack of
data. We are thus violating the assumption of zero conditional mean (Wooldridge 2013). We will
anyway estimate this model:
Yit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Qit + β3τt + β4τ
2
t + it (2)
Where Y is average GPA, Pass or Grad at the school level i and academic year t (with t =
06, 07, 08, 09). X is the log of the inflation adjusted cost per student, this is our variable of interest.
We use this rather than just cost per student in order to get the effect in percent change rather
than in absolute change.9 τ is a time trend (with τ = 1, 2, 3, 4), τ2 is the squared values of τ .10
Q is a variable on the demographic composition of students. It includes parent education, parent
abroad, born abroad and proc boys11.  is the idiosyncratic error for each school and time period.
6.2 Difference in difference
As mentioned a more credible identification strategy for this quasi-experimental setting is a difference-
in-difference model. To do this we need a treatment and a control group. Unfortunately no schools
are untreated in this case. In fact all schools were affected by the reform, but with different mag-
nitude. An ideal research design would be that only a few randomly selected schools would get
more funding and the other would be totally unchanged. We try to imitate this scenario by using
the winners, losers and unchanged categories defined in section 5. This is by default an arbitrary
treatment and control group, but this method is no uncommon when there is a whole population
that is treated to varying degrees (Fredriksson and O¨ckert 2007).
9This also requires the assumption that an increase in funding from 50 000 SEK per student to 60 000 SEK will
give the same effect as an increase from 100 000 SEK to 120 000 SEK. We think this is a reasonable assumption.
However if we do it with levels we get almost the exact same results.
10The reason being that grade inflation is higher for lower grades and then suffer from diminishing returns, this
is due to grades not being able to go above 320
11See table 1 for full definitions
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Before specifying the formal regression we are going to look at our variables for student per-
formance to see if the common trends assumption that is necessary for a difference-in-difference
estimation holds up. We want to see parallel trends in the outcome variable before the treat-
ment. In figure vi, vii and viii we can analyze the trends in our measurements. We include both
non-winners and the unchanged category. They are both plausible control groups. As the figures
show they both indicate common trends for GPA and Grad. Pass however does not show any
parallel trends for either group so we will not use that in our difference-in-difference regressions.
The underlying values are also presented in table 7.
Figure vi: Average gpa
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Figure vii: Average pass-rate
2006 2007 2008 2009
60
65
70
75
80
Year
P
A
S
S
winners
unchanged
non-winners
Page 23
6.2 Difference in difference Mattias Hallberg, Carl Nilsson
Figure viii: Average graduation rate
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Table 7: Testing the common trends assumption
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Winners
gpa pre 8 198.7 16.7 178 223.9
gpa post 8 204 20 181.4 232.4
grad pre 8 83 9.4 69 97.1
grad post 8 82.8 8.9 71.6 95.7
pass pre 8 64.4 13 46.2 79.5
pass post 8 66.9 11 54 84.5
Unchanged
gpa pre 39 219.1 29.5 153.1 273.3
gpa post 39 220.3 30.4 152.8 274.3
grad pre 39 88.9 12.3 51.7 99.7
grad post 39 87.9 12.9 47.8 100
pass pre 39 74.5 16.7 32 98.3
pass post 38 75.2 16.8 34.2 96.4
Non-winners
gpa pre 46 221.3 27.9 153.1 273.3
gpa post 46 222.5 28.8 152.8 274.3
grad pre 46 89.8 11.6 51.7 99.7
grad post 46 88.9 12.1 47.8 100
pass pre 46 75.5 15.6 32 98.3
pass post 45 76 15.5 34.2 96.4
Our first DD-model is the easiest two period difference-in-difference one can imagine:
Yit = β0 + β1Postt + β2Winneri + β3(Post ∗Winner)ti + β4Qti + it (3)
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Where Y is either average GPA or Grad at the school level i and academic year t (with
t = 06, 07, 08, 09). Winner is a binary variables that is 1 if a school is a winner and 0 if it is a
non-winner as defined in section 5. Post is a binary variables that is 1 if the academic year is 08 or
09 otherwise it is 0. Q are variables on socioeconomic composition12 that are relevant to include.
 is the idiosyncratic error for each school and time period.
From this regression we will be able to derive how much GPA and Grad changed before and
after the reform in the winners and non-winners groups. The interpretation of the coefficients will
be as follows:
• GPA/Grad of non-winners pre-reform = β0 + β4
• GPA/Grad of winners pre-reform = β0 + β2 + β4
• GPA/Grad of non-winners post-reform = β0 + β1 + β4
• GPA/Grad of winners post-reform = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4
Taking the GPA/Grad of the winners post-reform minus post-reform and then taking the
difference from non-winners post-reform minus post-reform will give us the difference in difference
estimator which as shown in equation 4 is = β3.
((β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4)− (β0 + β2 + β4))− ((β0 + β1 + β4)− (β0 + β4)) = β3 (4)
In addition to this model we will use a more sophisticated difference-in-difference model to try
to capture the notion that the effect of increasing resources should be additive. There is a lot of
support in the literature for what is called the added value hypothesis that the longer a student is
exposed to more resources the larger the effect. In order for us to separate the effect from being
treated one year or two years we will use this model that is common when analyzing a treatment
that is thought to be increasing as time passes (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
Yit = β0 + β1Timet + β2Winneri + β3(Time ∗Winner)ti + β4Qti + it (5)
This is the same as in model 3 with the difference that Time a vector of year dummies for 2006,
2007 and 2008 are included in the regression instead of Post. In contrary to the pooled post-reform
period model this will allow us to look the effect of one year and two years of treatment separately.
With a difference-in-difference approach there is not always necessary to include background
variables to control for composition effects if they are assumed to be a fixed effect. That is to say
that there is no group specific time trends within the socioeconomic compositions of schools. To
determine what background variables to add in our regressions we would like to know how they
12See table 1 for full definition
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change pre- and post-reform and in the winners and non-winners group separately. To get this
information we run a regression similar to model ?? but instead using each of the variables on
socioeconomic composition, parent edu, born abroad, parent abroad and proc boys as Y .
Yit = β0 + β1Postt + β2Winneri + β3(Post ∗Winner)ti + it (6)
Using the same interpretation as above we get some interesting information from this regression.
If β̂1 is significant then we know that there is a change in that variable pre- and post-reform for the
whole population of schools. If β̂2 is significant then we know that there is a significant difference
between the winner and non-winners schools before the reform. And is β̂3 is significant we know
that there is a group specific change in that variables. Then it will be necessary to include it in
our regressions.
6.3 Standard errors
The standard errors of a difference-if-difference estimation have been discussed by Bertrand et
al (2004). who find that most studies using a difference-in-difference strategy understate their
standard errors (Bertrand et al. 2004). This is because of serial correlation in the data. They
argue that studies relying on longer time series are more vulnerable to this critique and since we
only use four time periods this should not be a major problem. But we will also use two of the
prescriptions Bertrand et al. suggest. The first is to ignore time series data which is what we
do in 3. The second solution to the serial correlation problem is to cluster the standard errors.
Angrist and Pischke argues that the standard errors will be underestimated if there are fewer than
42 clusters (Angrist and Pischke 2009). This criteria is for us fulfilled, since we have 54 clusters.
We will thus use cluster robust standard errors at the school level in all our regressions and not
just where a time series is included. We argue that these clusters are well-defined, which is a
requirement for using cluster robust standard errors (Wooldridge 2013).
7 Results
7.1 OLS
Table 8 presents the results from the multiple regression. They all show a significant negative
correlation between resources and students performance. There are strong reasons to believe that
these results are biased, and this will be covered in more detail in the discussion.
Columns (1)-(3) shows that a one percent increase in cost would lead to a, −6.6, −3.8 and −2.8
change in GPA, Pass and Grad respectively. The constants in these regressions are the intercept of
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the regression and does not tell us much since no school actually had zero funding. The coefficient
for the constant however imply that a school that did not receive any funding would have a GPA
of 962.2, which is impossible since there is a cap on GPA which is 320. The same goes for Grad
and Pass which have a cap of 100.
Column (4)-(6) shows us the same regression but now with an added time trend and the results
are almost the same as before. In column (7)-(9) we also add our background variables to account
for composition effects. When including them we can see that we get coefficient closer to zero
and also a higher R-squared. This would imply that we now explain more of the variation in our
outcome variables and that correlation between the background variables and cost per student
accounts for some of the negative effects on our outcome variables.
The R-square for the regressions in column (1)-(3) is as high as 0.453, this would imply that
log cost explain roughly 40 percent of the variation in student performance. This is likely an
overstatement that is caused by cost being correlated with other factors that have an impact on
GPA. This is also what we would expect since the resource allocation model used in Stockholm
was designed to compensate schools with weaker students. This would explain why we get so high
values for R-square. Reversed causality might also be a problem here. We know that the resource
allocation model does not take grades into account, but schools do received more funding after
receiving more immigrant students, which in turn is associated with lower GPA, Grad and Pass.
To but the coefficient of interest from column (7) into a context they suggests that a 1 percent
increase in costs per student would generate a 3.3 point decrease in GPA. If they were true then
we would expect a decrease in GPA with over 60 points in the winner schools since all of them got
more than 20 percent extra funding after the reform which is unlikely.
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7.2 Difference-in-Difference
When we run the difference-in-difference regressions we get a very different results compared to the
standard OLS estimation. The results are presented in table 9. None of the difference-in-difference
estimators are statistically significant but they all estimate a positive effect of being a winner. The
coefficients on GPA range from approximately 1-3 points per year of treatment and for Grad the
coefficient are less than 1 point.
Column (1)-(4) are the results from the two period difference-in-difference and column (5)-(8)
are the results from the regression with year-dummies. In the two period regressions Winner x
Post can be interpreted as the average effect of attending a winner school for 1.5 years. This
is because both 2008 and 2009 is included in the regression and the average time in a winner
school post-reform is then 1.5 years. Post indicate how much GPA and Grad changed for the non-
winners. In (1) and (3) Winners show that the winner schools had a significantly lower GPA and
graduation rate before the reform. The constant is the GPA/Grad for the non-winners pre-reform.
In (2) and (4) you need to add the coefficient of the background variables with the constant to
get the true intercept. The coefficients on Winner can in columns (2) and (4) be interpreted that
there were no significant difference pre-reform in GPA and Grad once socioeconomic composition
has been controlled for. In (2) and (4) Winner x Post increases for Grad and decreases for GPA
in comparison to the regressions without background variables. Note also that Post becomes
significant for Grad - meaning that there was a significant decrease in graduation rate after the
reform across all schools once socioeconomic factors has been taken into account.
In column (5) and (7) Winner x 2008 is the effect of one year at a winner school and Winner
x 2009 is the effect of two years at a winner school. As expected we can see an increasing effect
as time passes from the reform. However in all regressions with year dummies the estimation of
Winner x 2008 and Winner x 2009 are not statistically significantly different from each other.
The year-dummies 2007, 2008 and 2009 show the year fixed effect that is to say the variation
in GPA and Grad that can be attributed to a specific year. Winner and Constant is now the
GPA/Grad for winners and non-winners 2006 rather than an average of 2006 and 2007 as it is in
column (1)-(4).
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Table 9: Regression results from DD on 20 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES gpa gpa grad grad gpa gpa grad grad
Winner x Post 4.087 1.941 0.740 1.594
(5.088) (4.145) (2.476) (2.074)
Post 1.195 0.146 -0.902 -1.448**
(1.437) (1.392) (0.800) (0.606)
Winners x 2008 3.059 1.457 0.390 1.099
(6.896) (5.926) (3.334) (2.850)
Winners x 2009 5.114 2.507 1.089 2.161
(4.623) (4.190) (2.432) (2.191)
2007 -2.883 -2.288 -2.196*** -2.040***
(1.832) (2.004) (0.803) (0.743)
2008 -0.738 -2.324 -2.413** -3.074***
(1.884) (2.107) (1.091) (0.936)
2009 0.244 0.248 -1.587 -1.926**
(2.342) (2.249) (1.157) (0.894)
parent abroad 0.196 0.0394 0.203 0.0445
(0.181) (0.0821) (0.184) (0.0828)
parent edu 71.01*** 10.05* 71.46*** 10.35*
(13.62) (5.553) (13.60) (5.488)
born abroad -0.203 -0.485*** -0.202 -0.485***
(0.259) (0.0894) (0.261) (0.0889)
proc boys -0.487** -0.127 -0.473** -0.116
(0.203) (0.0795) (0.208) (0.0816)
Winner -22.58*** -6.253 -6.881* 0.395 -22.58*** -6.270 -6.881* 0.379
(6.976) (4.799) (3.606) (2.165) (7.026) (4.823) (3.631) (2.173)
Constant 221.3*** 84.02** 89.84*** 78.84*** 222.7*** 83.32** 90.94*** 78.55***
(4.133) (33.72) (1.715) (14.22) (3.974) (33.78) (1.667) (14.10)
Observations 216 212 216 212 216 212 216 212
R-squared 0.067 0.608 0.038 0.568 0.069 0.610 0.043 0.574
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: There are missing values in the background variables at one school that can make comparison between the
regression with and without them less straight forward.
We included all the background variables in both regressions even though table 10 show no
group specific time trends in any of them. However parent abroad changes significantly after
the reform as the coefficient on Post indicate in column (2) table 10 and the winner schools had
a significantly higher share of students that was born abroad and smaller share of students with
highly educated parents before the reform as the coefficient on Winners show in column (1) and (4)
table 10. There could possibly be some interaction effect between those factors that can influence
GPA and Grad so we add all background variables in order to see how it changed our results.
Interestingly the coefficient for GPA decreases and the coefficient for Grad did the opposite. It is
a bit unclear how these results should be interpreted, but since adding background variables do
not change the coefficients that much and since all variables of interest are insignificant it does not
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seem to matter that much if they are included or not.
Table 10: Estimation on group specific trends in socioeconomic composition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES born abroad parent abroad proc boys parent edu
winners x post 2.756 -1.471 -3.288 0.0213
(1.785) (1.923) (1.997) (0.0312)
post -0.756 3.533*** 1.100 0.00867
(0.776) (0.802) (1.111) (0.00980)
winners 10.41* 6.261 3.590 -0.189**
(5.461) (4.650) (2.165) (0.0772)
Constant 12.59*** 14.99*** 50.72*** 2.272***
(2.181) (2.280) (1.056) (0.0449)
n 212 212 212 212
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We also included a correlation table and a VIF table in appendix C in order to control for
multicollinearity in the regressions where the background variables are included. Some of the
variables are highly correlated but does not appear to cause a multicollinearity problem.
For a bit more intuitive interpretation of the two period regression presented in column (1) in
table 9 we also include table 11 where first difference, second difference and difference-in-difference
are calculated along with the corresponding standard errors.
Table 11: Pooled difference-in-difference on GPA
Winners Non-winners Difference
2006-07 198.7*** 221.3*** 22.6***
(5.6) (4.1) (7.0)
2008-09 204.0*** 222.5*** 18.5**
(6.7) (4.3) (8.0)
Difference 5.3 1.2 4.1
(4.9) (1.4) (5.1)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To make sure that the results are robust, i.e. does not change dramatically when we use different
cut-off points to define winners and losers we run the same regressions when defining winners with
25% and 15% as cut-off points. The estimations stay statistically insignificant but in the 25%
group the coefficients are higher as expected but for some reason the effect is decreasing and not
increasing from an extra year of treatment. In the 15% group the effect is almost zero for all
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estimations with the exception of Winner x 2009 for Grad which for some reason is higher than
the 20% group. We also try excluding the loser schools from the control group so that we only
compare the winners to the schools that were unchanged. Then the coefficients stay mostly the
same. The results are presented in detail in appendix C.
8 Discussion
8.1 Aggregated data
One of the major problems with this study is that we do not observe our outcome variables; GPA,
Pass and Grad, at an individual level, instead we compare school averages. This is also true for the
background variables. In our regression we do not weight the observation in accordance with the
number of students they were calculated from. A change in student performance and socioeconomic
composition at a small or large school will thus artificially bias the results of any regression. This
problem could probably be solved using a weighted least square method or by accessing individual
data on the performance of all students. We can not do any of this within the scope of this thesis,
but we can present the weighted average GPA by winners and non-winners. This is shown in table
3.1.
When using the weighted averages for a simplistic DD we also observe a higher difference-in-
difference estimator than in the non-weighted data. The estimator rises from 4.1 (table 11) to 5.2
in table 12 . Without new data we are however not able to do a formal regression or calculate the
standard errors. The results are also shown grafically with comparison to the non weighted data
in figure ix.
Table 12: DD with weighted values
Weighted GPA
Winners Non-winners Difference
2006-07 200.0 223.2 22.2
2008-09 208.6 225.6 17.0
Difference 7.6 2.4 5.2
Note: These values was created by calculating the share
of graduating students each school had within its group
(winners and non-winners) for every year that weight was
then multiplied with the GPA of that school and year. The
sum of those weighted GPA-values is what is presented in
the table
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Figure ix: GPA with weighted values
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Note: This graph was created the same way as table 12. The unweighted trends are also included for easy comparison
Even though this is a major problem for this thesis it should be relatively easy to overcome
if the individual data for the adequate years was collected. With individual data available more
control variables could also be included in the regression and thus increase the precision. It would
also be possible to do sub group analysis, for instance look specifically on student with foreign
background or low socioeconomic status. The literature on school spending also suggest that the
effect should be higher for those students.
8.2 Controlling for organizational effects
As mentioned in section 2 the change in resource allocation was not the only change that the
reform in 2007 brought with it, there was also an organizational reform. One could assume that
the management before the school had varying quality where some districts had more competent
managers then others. If our winner schools, that were under the responsibility of only five separate
districts before the reform, for some reason had relatively worse (or better) management than the
non-winners that could bias our results.
It is possible in theory to test whether or not there was a group specific organizational effect
for the winners. However our data does not allow for that and we have thus not included it in
this thesis. The test would in short consists of creating a pseudo-treatment group with the schools
that were in one of the five districts that had a winner school post-reform. Then the same DD-
regression as we did in this thesis with the change that all the winner schools were dropped would
be used to estimate the size of the organizational effect. The problem with our data is first and
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foremost that all schools in districts 13 and 1713 are winners so the organizational effect for those
districts cannot be tested. And secondly there is no plausible common trend assumption between
the pseudo-treatment group and the control group.
There might be other ways to control for this anticipated effect if better data or more sophis-
ticated methods could be used.
8.3 Selection problem
When making a difference-in-difference regressions it is preferable if the sample or the treatment
group was assigned using some kind of randomization, though this is not always possible, the reform
we study being an example of this. The process was not completely random and the policymakers
had a rough idea of how it would turn out for the different school. This causes a problem, since
this will bias our data and it is hard to tell in which direction or how strong the bias will be.
A question that arises is if we still measure resources effect on schools in general, or if we are
actually measuring the effect on schools with a relatively high ratio of students with low grades
and immigrant background?
There are a few problems associated with this, we will however just bring up two; the first
being discussed up by David Figlo (1999). He argues that schools have different functional forms
and that you cannot compare rich schools with impoverished schools. He further argues that in
all the existing literature makes the assumption that the production function is homotheticity and
additivity. What this implies is that we can expect the same output for different schools and
different students. Figlo (1999) argues that one cannot expect an increase to have the same effect
regardless of magnitude; student endowed effects, if the school is rich or if the school might just
have a more innovative way of teaching. The relation is usually assumed to be the same, which
Figlo argues is one reason for studies showing no results when studying resources and student
performance (Figlo 1999).
If Figlo is correct, then it would be wrong for us to study rich schools with impoverished schools.
This is however exactly what we are doing, or rather schools with high and low ratios of students
with socioeconomic status. This would according to Figlo understate the effect of resources on
student performance. This is problematic in many ways and even if we had had internal validity
in this thesis there would be great threat to the external validity of the results.
We also argue that the overall trend in student performance is seemingly unchanged during
these years. This would imply that there is something else driving the trend, which is in line
with what we have seen in most of the literature. For instance a resent research review on what
the driving forces behind the school results in Swedish primary school points at three dominant
13See appendix A to identify these
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trends; segregation, decentralization and individualization. They argue that resources have some
effect but more so for younger students and students with low socioeconomic status (Skolverket
2012). So even if we do have a problem with sample selection, we would argue that our results
most likely would have come out the same, i.e. insignificant.
Using a suitable control group was another problem. In a perfect world we would like temporal
stability, casual transience and unit homogeneity, though these assumption are not likely to ever
hold in a school environment, since it is constantly exposed to different reforms. Furthermore we
do have a problem with our control group being subject to the same reform as the treatment group.
Though we were able to see from figure iv that the amount of resources stayed the same for some
schools. We argue that this makes it possible to use them as our control group, since the reform
barely affected those schools. In a perfect world we would like to study the counterfactual. That
being the same group with and without treatment, though this is obviously impossible, hence the
need to always compromise when it comes to treatment and control group. One alternative control
group that could be explored in future research could be the independent schools in Stockholm
who were left unchanged during this period.
Another note on the control and treatment group is that one would usually prefer to do a
Wilcoxon signed rank test, in order to test for significant changes to the group composition. Though
one assumption that needs to hold in order for this to work is that of the distribution of the variable
being normally distributed or at least symmetrical. This assumption does however only apply if
the amount of observations is smaller than 16. When we controlled for symmetry for our variables
we found that none of them came close to being symmetrical. We are thus in violation of the
assumption of normality in the treatment group, since this sample is smaller than 16. Our control
group does however exceed 15 observations and is thus considered to be approximately normally
distributed, despite having an underlying probability density function that is not. We did despite
this try to make a Wilcoxon for both the winner and control group, even though we have a violation
of the normality assumption in the winners group. The p-values did not come out as one would
expect when comparing them to the changes between the groups and periods that we see when
just eyeballing the absolute changes. Since the p-values in the winner group could and probably
is biased due to the normality violation, we instead tried to measure the difference by making
a difference-in-difference on the background variables in order to conclude which variables that
might have changed significantly. We do this since we want to make sure that a school did not get
increased funding due to getting a higher proportion of students that is associated with a higher
grant, such as being born abroad.
This kind of reform could also create a self selection problem, that is to say that more student
and in fact student with different characteristics would try to get into a school that got more
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money. This would be a major problem if we had longer time series, but with our short time frame
we do not think that a lot of students or parents would change school half the way through upper
primary school14.
8.4 Alternative types of measurement
Using GPA as a measurement for student performance over time has been criticized both for
reliability and validity reasons. The literature on grading, fairness and their relationship to actual
skills are vast and nothing we can comment on in the scope of this thesis. The reliability however
is something that has been commented on from an economics perspective; especially the influence
of grade inflation has been discussed (Skolverket 2009 IFAU 2011). It would thus be interesting to
use some other outcome variable to see if the results stay the same. The preferred measurement
is a standardized test as used by OECD in their PISA-study; this would more accurately measure
actually knowledge rather than grades that could have been subject to grade inflation or unfair
grading. The implication that this would have on our thesis is that we have not and were not able
to control for actual knowledge, which would be preferable.
Another common measurement is life time earnings; this is used as a proxy for skills, which
in turn is what the education system is used for, that being individuals acquiring skills. This is
also data that we did not have when writing this thesis, though it would certainly be a better
measurement than GPA.
8.5 Grade composition
The schools that we have in our data set consists of schools that have different grade compositions,
ranging from having grade K-9 to just having 7-9. The reason why this might cause a problem is
that we only know that the school got more money, though we do not know how, to which grade
or on what the money was spent. What could have happened is that a school that we qualified
as a winner might have spent all their extra resources on the students in grade 1-7 and leaving
year 8-9 unchanged. If this would be the case, then the school should have been in the unchanged
group instead of being in the winner group. This would lead us to observe the difference between
students that actually got the same amount of resources both before and after the reform. We are
however unable to control for this with the data available to us.
As we described in section 3 national tests in grade three were introduced in this period, this
would influence the schools with grade 3 in their organization and not the others. It is not entirely
unlikely that a school would steer additional money to lower ages if they know that those students
will be tested for the first time.
14Grade 7-9
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8.6 Omitted variable bias
When making our OLS-regressions we only controlled for a few of all possible OVB that there
might be. This is due to limitations of our data set, a few examples of some variables that are
often used when controlling for OVB that we did not have is: Peer effects, school fixed effects,
teacher density, classroom size and teacher education, just to mention a few common ones. PISA
made a comprehensive list of different control variables (OECD 2014) all of which we would ideally
had used, though that would be beyond the scope of this thesis. This makes it hard for us to draw
any inference from our OLS, since the assumption of zero conditional mean is violated. Especially
when we know that we most likely have several biases that also work in different directions.
9 Conclusion
In this thesis we tried to answer the question: Will more funding generate better academic results
in primary school? The data used when trying to answer this question was as mentioned in the
data section collected from the following sources: The student performance, background and school
size data comes from the two national databases SALSA (Skolverkets Arbetsverktyg fo¨r Lokala
SambandsAnalyser), SIRIS (Skolverkets Internetbaserade Resultat- och kvalitetsInformationsSys-
tem) and the data on school funding was collected from the School and Education Division and
the District Councils in Stockholm City (Stockholm stad). The data was then used to make an
OLS and a difference-in-difference estimation of the effects of increased funding, none of which
produced any significant results.
The first conclusion of this thesis that we found is that the centralization reform in Stockholm
created winners and losers in terms of funding. For most schools the resources did not change
much, but on the extreme there were schools that got substantially more or less money. We also
conclude that this reform should lend itself to interesting pseudo experimental studies on the effect
of resources on student performance.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that our results indicate that
there might be a positive effect on student performance of increasing school funding. However
a significant correlation between resources and student performance cannot be established using
our data and empirical method. The indications for an effect are both the contrast between the
DD-estimations and the ordinary OLS-regression and the fact that longer time at a treated school
renders a higher coefficient. We also see that a higher cut-off point in our definition of winners give
higher coefficients and a lower cut-off point do the opposite. These indications are nevertheless not
sufficient to draw any definite conclusions on the true relationship between resources and student
performance.
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The major problem with our data is the fact that we use aggregated data on student perfor-
mance and not individual data. The observations on school level are thus not weighted for the
number of students who graduate at a specific year. Our results could be biased for a whole host
of different reasons but that is the most obvious flaw in our study. This was covered in more detail
in section 8.
Had our results been significant and possible to draw trustworthy inference from then they
would indicate an economically significant relationship between resources and student performance.
The effect would be approximately 2.5 GPA points per year of treatment. The treatment being a
30 percent increase of total resources, which was the average increase in our winner group. If we
assume that the effect is the same for every year with the treatment, which is a rather conservative
assumption since some literature, suggest that resources have bigger impact on younger students
(Lazear 2001), then we would multiply 2.5 with 9 to get the full treatment effect of increasing
the school budget with 30 percent. That would analogously result in the rough estimation that a
one percent increase in school budget would generate 0.75 points higher GPA and 0.25 percentage
points higher graduation rate. This does however not take diminishing returns or possible nonlinear
relationship between resources and grades into account.
If we compare these results to both the STAR-project and the results from Fredriksson and
O¨ckert (2007), who found evidence for the same effect size as STAR we see that our effect size
are roughly the same. In the STAR-project a class size reduction of seven students in four years
(one year of preschool and grade 1-3) gave an effect of 0.2 standard deviations on test scores. To
compare our results we need to translate a class size reduction to an increase in school funding.
Krueger and Lindahl (2002) argue that the cost of a class size reduction is proportional to the
percent increase in number of classes. Unfortunately there are no data on average class size in
Sweden. Fredriksson and O¨ckert 2007 estimate the class size in 2002/03 to be 25 students per
class. A reduction of seven student would then require somewhere around 30 percent increase in
school funding. According to our estimations a 30 percent increase in resources for three years
would generate an increase with 0.2 standard deviations for both GPA and Grad.
To put this in terms of policy, a one percent increase in primary school spending in Sweden would
cost 0.88 billion SEK according to the Association of Regions and Local Authorities (Landsting
2015). Krueger and Lindahl 2002 use a projection of how increased test results impacts life time
wages to calculate the long term return on investments from reducing class size with the same
amount as the STAR-project and finds that this would be a economic sound investment.
We thus conclude that more research should be conducted on the subject and with the cost
data that we have collected for this project. The data could not only be used to estimate the effect
of increasing or decreasing school funding for an individual school. Since our accounting data are
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quite rich we also assume that it will lend itself to study what schools that get extra money actually
do with the new resources. Do they invest in more teachers? Smaller classes? Better teachers?
The questions are many and are all very relevant for policymakers.
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Appendices
A School organization in Stockholm
Figure Aa: Map of Stockholm and the districts before the reform.
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This is a map of Stockholm and the 18 districts that was responsible for primary schools before the reform.
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Table A1: Districts
District Number
Bromma 1
Enskeda-A˚rsta 2
Vanto¨r 3
Farsta 4
Ha¨gersten 5
Liljeholmen 6
Ha¨sselby-Va¨llingby 7
Rinkeby 8
Kungsholmen 9
Norrmalm 10
Kista 11
Skarpna¨ck 12
Ska¨rholmen 13
Sp˚anga-Tensta 14
Maria-Gamla stan 15
Katarina-Sofia 16
A¨lvsjo¨ 17
O¨stermalm 18
In our data all schools are given a number to indicate what district they belonged to before the reform.
B Data
Table B1: All school in our data-set
School-ID Alt-ID School name Excluded Dist. Winner Treatment
21724208 Sa¨traskolan 0 13 1 33.28
18023801 42149666 Husbyskolan/ Hus-
byg˚ardsskolan
0 11 0 7.07
46581319 Lillholmsskolan 0 13 1 39.120596
59249600 Katarina Norra skola 0 16 0 -6.0894847
37416253 26852132 Sp˚anga gymnasium,
grundskolan
0 14 0 -25.72
60382920 R˚agsvedsskolan 0 3 0 -2.84
87521048 Engelbrektsskolan 0 18 0 -22.80
24716970 Mariaskolan 0 15 0 -27.96
13679897 Bagarmossens skola 0 12 0 17.91
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Continuation of Table
School-ID Alt-ID School Outlier District Winner Treatment
15594566 A¨ppelviksskolan 0 1 0 -16.82
51341279 Vinstag˚ardsskolan 0 7 0 2.23
82140090 Ha¨sselby Villastads
skola
0 7 0 -5.62
72672270 Aspuddens skola 0 6 0 9.57
16348406 Matteusskolan 0 10 0 15.93
99648792 Adolf Fredriks
musikklasser
0 10 0 -7.89
17640364 Sundbyskolan 0 14 0 -25.76
36031993 Bredbyskolan 0 8 0 -3.12
75614609 A˚so¨ grundskola 0 15 0 -21.80
69895255 So¨dermalmsskolan 0 15 0 -13.19
72248694 Enskede skola 0 2 0 2.13
43632318 Enbacksskolan 0 14 0 -14.95
72627865 Alviksskolan 0 1 0 -2.93
13124830 Sjo¨a¨ngsskolan 0 17 1 28.20
14121892 Breda¨ngsskolan 0 13 1 27.26
43088454 Bjo¨rkhagens skola 0 12 0 -13.69
41176931 Ga¨rdesskolan 0 18 0 -1.39
19353396 Frua¨ngens skola 0 5 0 17.47
97683561 Johan Skytteskolan 0 17 1 34.16
86597125 Ha¨sselbyg.rdsskolan 0 7 0 19.99
18000402 Ho¨galidsskolan 0 15 0 -6.89
27287797 Rinkebyskolan 0 8 0 -.43
88795871 So¨dra a¨ngby skola F-9 0 1 0 -36.90
38758770 Kvickenstorpsskolan/
Farsta grundskola
0 4 1 26.60
34671128 Blommensbergsskolan 0 6 0 6.44
82110758 Hagsa¨traskolan 0 3 1 23.60
18029307 29410344 Stadshagsskolan/
Kungsholmens grund
0 9 1 22.23
61686233 R˚alambshovsskolan 0 9 0 -3.45
50060022 Trollbodaskolan 0 7 0 -4.14
23617768 Sofia skola 0 16 0 -14.66
36281817 Ho¨glandsskolan 0 1 0 6.45
83828066 Nya Elementar 0 1 0 -2.62
11218326 A¨rvingeskolan 0 11 0 9.13
91816093 Sturebyskolan 0 2 0 1.37
52863414 71754599 Vasa Real 0 10 0 -27.74
57184925 Ho¨kara¨ngsskolan 0 4 0 -8.83
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Continuation of Table
School-ID Alt-ID School Outlier District Winner Treatment
46165232 Ma¨larho¨jdens skola 0 5 0 -7.99
69266159 18022102 Hjulstaskolan 0 14 0 3.28
48328583 A˚rstaskolan 0 2 0 2.39
44673074 Abrahamsbergsskolan 0 1 0 -2.00
94864296 Eriksdalsskolan 0 15 0 -8.00
20683111 Ba¨ckahagens skola 0 3 0 2.21
93412255 Gubba¨ngsskolan 0 4 0 -1.92
82850292 Va¨llingbyskolan 0 7 0 11.09
97686250 Ro¨dabergsskolan 0 10 0 5.82
37796564 18032501 Akallaskolan/ Sten-
hagskolan
1 11 - -
15331669 Solbergaskolan 1 17 - -
89605548 Grimstaskolan 1 7 - -
87838841 Smedshagsskolan 1 7 - -
23618510 Nytorpsskolan/ Ham-
marbyskola
1 2 - -
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Table B2: Comments on data collection from the different districts
District nr Comments
Bromma 1 None
Enskede-A˚rsta 2 Month 13 was created with the available data and then added to
the first halv year.
Vanto¨r 3 None
Farsta 4 Even though half year cost are available we construct the half
year cost variable since the wage cost is unevenly distributed over
the years in the actual acounting. This is most likely an aconting
error.
Ha¨gersten 5 None
Liljeholmen 6 None
Ha¨sselby-Va¨llingby 7 Do not have month 13 and it can not be created.
Rinkeby 8 None
Kungsholmen 9 None
Norrmalm 10 None
Kista 11 Accounting number 601 is excluded for rents instead of 510
Skarpna¨ck 12 None
Ska¨rholmen 13 Accounting number 530 is excluded for rents instead of 510
Sp˚anga-Tensta 14 Accounting number 610 is excluded for rents instead of 510. Ac-
tual half year cost was not available.
Maria-Gamla stan 15 Actual half year cost was not available.
Katarina-Sofia 16 Actual half year cost was not available.
A¨lvsjo¨ 17 None
O¨stermalm 18 No detailed accounting available for 2005 so rent costs cannot be
excluded, but the schools does not appear to be paying rent in
2006 and 2007 so it should not be a problem. Actual half year
cost was not available.
Note: All monthly accounting is divided in 13 month where month 13 is a ”correctional month” that is used
for practical reasons. The cost attributed to that month, if any, should be included in the first half year to get
a correct value. In the normal cases where month 13 was included in the records that is how we have done it.
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Figure Ba: Average inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student (cut-off 15 percent)
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Figure Bb: Average inflation and time trend adjusted cost per student (cut-off 25 percent)
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C Results
When making our regressions we wanted to make sure that we controlled for collinearity, in order
to do this we constructed a correlation matrix, see tabel ??. The correlation for most of our
variables is fairly high, so we calculated the VIF for the most specified OLS- and DD-model in
order to make sure that the variables do not inflate our standard errors. There is no clear rule on
an exact value for VIF that you can use in order to check if it is ok to use the variable or not,
but a general rule of thumb is that a VIF below 10 is OK (Cortinhas and Black 2012). The VIFs
for our variables are all under 10 and we are thus able to use all of them in our regressions, even
though the correlation between them is fairly high.
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Table C1: Cross-correlations
VARIABLES gpa grad pass log
cost
parent
abroad
parent
edu
born
abroad
proc
boys
winners treatment
gpa 1
grad 0.88 1
pass 0.90 0.91 1
log cost -0.65 -0.67 -0.66 1
parent abroad -0.55 -0.52 -0.61 0.46 1
parent edu 0.75 0.65 0.72 -0.56 -0.80 1
born abroad -0.63 -0.73 -0.70 0.53 0.64 -0.76 1.
proc boys -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 0.19 -0.00 -0.08 0.09 1
winners -0.26 -0.19 -0.22 0.11 0.12 -0.21 0.29 0.09 1
treatment -0.37 -0.29 -0.33 0.29 0.13 -0.26 0.29 0.26 0.70 1
Correlation on data from 2006-2009
Observations: 211
Table C2: VIF table for OLS
VARIABLES VIF
parent abroad 8.20
born abroad 5.11
parent edu 4.12
log cost 1.56
proc boys 1.05
Table C3: VIF table for DD
VARIABLES VIF
parent abroad 2.98
born abroad 2.56
parent edu 4.03
proc boys 1.05
winners 2.10
winners x 2008 1.72
winners x 2009 1.71
2007 1.51
2008 1.77
2009 1.76
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Table C4: Regression results from DD on 25 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES gpa gpa grad grad gpa gpa grad grad
Winneri x Post 6.403 2.535 2.617 2.212
(6.018) (5.249) (2.850) (2.640)
Post 1.089 0.150 -1.083 -1.449**
(1.406) (1.341) (0.780) (0.586)
Winner x 2008 8.665 4.813 4.002 3.280
(7.961) (7.359) (3.395) (3.325)
Winner x 2009 4.142 0.291 1.231 1.186
(4.848) (4.640) (3.079) (2.725)
2007 -2.883 -2.272 -2.196*** -2.034***
(1.832) (2.005) (0.803) (0.742)
2008 -1.248 -2.634 -2.800** -3.261***
(1.874) (2.049) (1.110) (0.913)
2009 0.542 0.609 -1.563 -1.718*
(2.344) (2.206) (1.126) (0.870)
parent abroad 0.196 0.0373 0.201 0.0416
(0.180) (0.0827) (0.183) (0.0835)
parent edu 71.11*** 9.988* 71.52*** 10.27*
(13.75) (5.515) (13.71) (5.447)
born abroad -0.211 -0.479*** -0.208 -0.478***
(0.256) (0.0918) (0.259) (0.0915)
proc boys -0.488** -0.126 -0.480** -0.118
(0.204) (0.0788) (0.210) (0.0816)
Winneri -25.07*** -5.437 -9.608** -0.486 -25.07*** -5.451 -9.608** -0.497
(7.153) (5.435) (3.684) (2.366) (7.204) (5.461) (3.710) (2.372)
Constant 220.7*** 83.63** 89.89*** 78.98*** 222.2*** 83.31** 90.99*** 78.90***
(4.009) (33.96) (1.654) (14.11) (3.840) (33.98) (1.594) (13.99)
Observations 216 212 216 212 216 212 216 212
R-squared 0.060 0.606 0.050 0.568 0.062 0.608 0.055 0.573
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C5: Regression results from DD on 15 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES gpa gpa grad grad gpa gpa grad grad
Winner x Post 0.0214 -0.377 0.655 1.845
(4.487) (3.542) (2.337) (1.866)
Post 1.795 0.648 -0.938 -1.584***
(1.386) (1.444) (0.753) (0.574)
Winner x 2008 -0.624 -2.069 0.0792 0.631
(5.481) (5.298) (2.853) (2.645)
Winner x 2009 0.667 1.324 1.230 3.071
(4.959) (3.303) (2.603) (1.899)
2007 -2.883 -2.316 -2.196*** -2.035***
(1.832) (1.991) (0.803) (0.743)
2008 -0.146 -1.523 -2.373** -3.001***
(1.932) (2.162) (1.099) (0.954)
2009 0.854 0.441 -1.699 -2.251**
(2.265) (2.360) (1.120) (0.880)
parent abroad 0.159 0.0288 0.165 0.0335
(0.182) (0.0835) (0.185) (0.0839)
parent edu 68.38*** 9.513* 68.78*** 9.768*
(13.57) (5.665) (13.55) (5.602)
born abroad -0.210 -0.473*** -0.210 -0.473***
(0.261) (0.0944) (0.263) (0.0939)
proc boys -0.438** -0.119 -0.428** -0.112
(0.185) (0.0723) (0.191) (0.0759)
Winner -20.32*** -8.671* -5.972* -1.864 -20.32*** -8.671* -5.972* -1.867
(7.061) (4.759) (3.126) (2.345) (7.112) (4.798) (3.148) (2.361)
Constant 222.5*** 89.10** 90.15*** 80.13*** 223.9*** 88.76** 91.25*** 80.12***
(4.346) (33.65) (1.834) (14.52) (4.185) (33.71) (1.781) (14.42)
Observations 216 212 216 212 216 212 216 212
R-squared 0.089 0.619 0.040 0.569 0.090 0.621 0.045 0.575
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C6: Regression results from DD on 20 percent with alternative control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES gpa gpa grad grad gpa gpa grad grad
Winner x Post 4.116 1.992 0.812 1.648
(5.156) (4.120) (2.524) (2.104)
Post 1.165 0.00819 -0.974 -1.492**
(1.623) (1.376) (0.924) (0.675)
Winner x 2008 2.857 1.149 0.374 0.963
(6.954) (5.911) (3.383) (2.846)
Winner x 2009 5.374 2.930 1.250 2.414
(4.759) (4.284) (2.509) (2.289)
2007 -3.404 -2.292 -2.232** -2.000**
(2.041) (2.299) (0.922) (0.856)
2008 -0.797 -2.112 -2.415* -2.958***
(2.065) (2.154) (1.259) (1.068)
2009 -0.276 -0.226 -1.766 -2.082**
(2.685) (2.420) (1.348) (1.020)
parent abroad 0.144 0.00780 0.148 0.0117
(0.158) (0.0797) (0.161) (0.0802)
parent edu 75.54*** 12.32** 75.83*** 12.53**
(13.50) (5.531) (13.49) (5.478)
born abroad -0.239 -0.494*** -0.238 -0.495***
(0.231) (0.0817) (0.233) (0.0812)
proc boys -0.547** -0.130 -0.531** -0.118
(0.236) (0.0965) (0.244) (0.0999)
Winner -20.36*** -3.649 -5.959 1.632 -20.36*** -3.676 -5.959 1.611
(7.371) (4.342) (3.749) (1.902) (7.432) (4.366) (3.780) (1.912)
Constant 219.1*** 77.13** 88.92*** 73.95*** 220.8*** 76.73** 90.04*** 73.78***
(4.753) (33.25) (1.987) (14.34) (4.559) (33.39) (1.931) (14.28)
Observations 188 184 188 184 188 184 188 184
R-squared 0.056 0.673 0.029 0.647 0.058 0.674 0.034 0.651
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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